Introduction
Building upon the work of North (1981 North ( , 1990 ) the argument contained in this paper is that the institutional structure of a nation, through its influence upon transaction costs, helps explain the ability of firms based in that nation to succeed or fail in a competitive global marketplace. This argument will be illustrated with reference to the case of Japan. Japan is chosen because it presents us with such an interesting example. Modern Japan was the first major industrial society to emerge from outside the Western tradition. Economically devastated by its loss in World War II, by 1990 Japan had the world's second largest economy and GDP per head 20 percent greater than that of the United States. This was achieved despite the fact that Japan is devoid of many natural economic advantages (raw materials, land, proximity to global markets). Herein we argue that the competitive success of Japanese firms in the global marketplace can in part be attributed to an institutional structure that enhances enterprise productivity by lowering the transaction costs of achieving cooperation and investments in specialization.
In order to make this argument, the paper is divided into four sections. The first discusses the concept of transaction costs. The second examines how a nation's institutional structure influences transaction costs. The third discuss the institutional structure of Japanese society, and particularly its informal institutions. The fourth identifies how the informal institutions of Japanese society lower transaction costs.
Transactions Costs
To survive in a competitive marketplace firms must minimize the cost of the resource inputs (land, labor, capital) required to produce a given output. Let us refer to these costs as resource costs. The key to minimizing resource costs is maximizing the productivity of resource inputs. In turn, this requires both cooperation and investments in specialization. As illustrated by Alchain and Demsetz's (1972) discussion of team production, cooperation between economic actors enhances productivity. As for investments in specialization, it has been known since Adam Smith that increased specialization can enhance productivity. However, neither cooperation nor investments in specialization can be achieved without a cost.
In the case of cooperation, costs arise due to the proclivity of self-interested resource owners to opportunistically shirk commitments and take a free ride on the efforts of others Demsetz 1972, Jensen and Meckling 1976) . The costs that must be borne to reduce shirking include (1) search costs borne to identify resource owners with a lower propensity to shirk, (2) negotiating costs, including the costs of any incentive systems designed to minimize shirking, (3) monitoring costs, and (4) enforcement costs. Despite bearing these costs, residual loss from shirking will remain. This is due to the inability of the above mechanisms to reduce shirking to zero in an uncertain and complex world where information is costly to collect, rationality is bounded and, accordingly, shirking is difficult to measure. Collectively, the costs borne to reduce shirking, plus any remaining residual loss from shirking, are referred to as transaction costs.
In the case of investments in specialization, costs arise because of the fear of hold-up (Klein et al. 1978 , Williamson 1985 . When specialization boosts productivity, the owner of the specialized resource can charge more for that resource than the owner of a less specialized resource. The existence of such a quasi-rent creates an incentive to invest in specialization. However, this incentive is tempered by the fact that the more specialized a resource becomes, the lower its value in alternative uses. The contingent value of a specialized resource exposes its owner to a greater risk of hold-up than the owner of a generalized resource. Hold-up occurs when one party to an exchange opportunistically expropriates the quasi rent that persuaded the other party to invest in specialization. This can be done by reneging on ex ante pricing agreements with the resource owner and demanding lower prices for the resource input once the specialized investment has been made. Given this possibility, the resource owner might never make the specialized investment and the gains from specialization will be lost.
The transaction costs in such circumstances are the costs that have to be borne to realize gains from specialization when a risk of hold-up exists. If these costs are less than the gains from specialization, they are worth bearing. In some cases, when the risk of hold-up is acute, it may be necessary to replace a market-mediated relationship with a formal hierarchy in order to persuade a resource owner to invest in specialization. However, this solution tends to be expensive because of bureaucratic diseconomies arising from incentive distortions, influence costs, coordination costs, and information processing problems within a hierarchy (Coase 1937 , Milgrom and Roberts 1990 , Williamson 1985 . In other cases, a governance arrangement that falls between market and hierarchy, such as quasi-integration backed by the exchange of hostages or some other credible commitment, may be sufficient to facilitate investments in specialization. The degree of danger from hold-up determines the most efficient governance mode for realizing the gains from specialization.
Institutional Structure and Transaction Costs
Following North (1981 North ( , 1990 one can argue that the institutional structure of a society can either raise or lower the transaction costs that must be borne to achieve a given level of cooperation and specialization. North HeMnes institutions as the constraints, both formal and informal, that shape human interaction. Formal constraints include formal political (and judicial) rules, economic rules and contracts. Informal constraints include the norms and value systems of a society: its culture or ideology. North argues that institutions provide a structure to economic exchange by defining the set of acceptable and unacceptable behaviors, the rules of the game as it were, and the sanctions, both legal and social, that will be applied to those who break the rules. Institutions can lower transaction costs by (1) propagating laws and norms that, ex ante, constrain the ability and limit the willingness of individual actors to engage in opportunism, (2) by creating mechanisms for monitoring adherence to contracts, and (3) by creating and maintaining legal and social sanctions that can be used to punish those who violate both the spirit and the letter of contracts.
Within this framework the role of government is to articulate and police the formal (legal) mles which govern exchange. There is no guarantee that a government will do this in a manner that is consistent with economic efficiency. Indeed North (1981) stresses that throughout history government actions have typically raised transaction costs. But if government does get it approximately right, confidence among economic actors that property rights will be protected and contracts can be enforced ex post will lower the transaction costs of achieving cooperation and specialization.
However, while the formal institutional structure of a society is important, informal institutions may constitute a more effective and less costly mechanism for governing exchange and facilitating cooperation. Informal constraints are better understood and more pervasive than formal constraints. The norms and value systems of a society are part of its tacit substructure. They dictate its social organization and define how individuals interact in everyday situations. Norms and value systems frequently function to facilitate cooperation, constrain opportunism and resolve disputes between members of a society. One only has to read the anthropological literature to get a sense for this (see Geertz 1973 , Turnbull 1972 .
Although there is no doubt that as societies become larger and more complex formal constraints become more important, informal constraints remain of primary importance in advanced industrial societies. Formal constraints are often seen as the last resort option for contract enforcement when all else fails. Arrow (1974) has argued that informal constraints (norms of trust and morality) must be assumed to operate in advanced market economies, since formal constraints alone could not stem force or fraud. Macaulay's (1963) studies of contractual practices support the view that contract disputes and ambiguities are more often settled by private ordering and appeal to informal norms of behavior than by appeal to the courts. Smith (1983) has documented how this is the case in Japan, where the majority of contract disputes are apparently settled without appeal to the legal system. Similarly, Ellickson (1986) has documented how the rural residents of Shasta County, California, resolved disputes over trespass damage done by stray livestock by applying informal rather than formal sanctions to violators. And finally, Granovetter (1985) has argued that concrete personal relationships between economic actors, and the trust that flows from those relationships, are more important in discouraging opportunism than formal constraints.
Formal constraints also have the disadvantage of being more expensive to activate than informal constraints. There are two reasons for this. First, it is costly to carry out legal research and to engage in legal proceedings (Ellickson 1986) . Second, informal constraints entail actors controlling their own behavior through acceptance of the norms and value systems of a society. This reduces the need for costly third party (formal) monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. When informal constraints are strong, a lower proportion of private and societal resources need be devoted to these formal mechanisms. Consequently, one can argue that given two societies that have identical formal constraints but different informal constraints, the level of opportunism, and hence transaction costs, will be lower in the society with stronger informal constraints.
Institutions in Japan
The contention made in this paper is that one important factor underlying the economic success of modern day Japan is a set of informal constraints that serve to economize on the transaction costs of achieving cooperation and specialization. The reason for stressing informal rather than formal constraints is that there is nothing particularly unique about Japan's formal constraints, when compared to those of other industrialized states. The formal constraints of present day Japan-its laws and regulations-are largely those imposed upon the country by the American occupiers after World War II. These constraints were based upon the American model (Haley 1987 (Haley , 1992 Smith 1983) . As such, while they certainly facilitated economic expansion, they provide no basis for the competitive advantage-as opposed to competitive parity-of Japanese firms over the firms of advanced Western nations.
One might object that the industrial policy implemented by MITI flies in the face of this contention. However, the reality is that the legal foundation for Japanese government actions with regard to industrial policy is not well developed (Haley 1987 (Haley , 1992 . No regulatory statute gives the government the power to enforce its intentions on private firms and firms cannot be subjected to legal sanctions for disregarding MITl's directives (Murakami et al. 1992 ). This is not to deny the role that industrial policy and MITI may have played in Japan's success (see Borrus et al. 1986; Yamamura 1982 Yamamura , 1986 . However, MITI relied upon consensus building rather than formal rules to implement its policy. Sanctions that were applied to transgressors were primarily social sanctions which took the form of exclusion from important informal associations between government bureaucrats and business leaders (Murakami et al. 1992) . In other words, MITI relied upon the informal constraints of Japanese society to achieve its objectives.
In contrast to the formal constraints of Japanese society, Japan's informal constraints do have an element of uniqueness. This uniqueness may have helped give Japanese manufacturing enterprises a competitive advantage in the global marketplace (Aoki 1988 (Aoki , 1990 Nakane 1970) , To appreciate this, we have to delve deeper into the structure of Japan's informal constraints. Numerous scholars have pointed out that the informal constraints of modern-day Japan are influenced by, and still largely resemble those that evolved during the Tokugawa period (Bellah 1957; Dore 1987; Ooms 1985; Smith 1983 Smith , 1992 . Thus, we must now look at the Tokugawa period.
The Tokugawa Value System The Tokugawa shogunate ruled Japan from 1603 until the Meiji restoration in 1868. The shogunate was founded by Tokugawa leyasu, who in 1600 defeated his chief rival and unified Japan under a single government after 150 years of civil war. Two hundred fifty years of peace followed, during which time the value system comprising the formal constraints of Japan evolved.
The norms and value system of Tokugawa Japan derived from two traditions: (1) the syncretistic fusion of Confucian, Buddhist, and Shinto religious and ethical thought known as neo-Confucianism, and (2) traditional agrarian village life (Bellah 1957 , Smith 1959 . While both traditions had roots that went back centuries, they reached their greatest refinement during the 250 years of Tokugawa peace (Maruyama 1974 , Ooms 1985 , Seven attributes of the value system that evolved during the Tokugawa period are of interest here. Each of these attributes has transaction cost implications. These attributes are the value placed upon (1) group identification, (2) collective responsibility, (3) loyalty and filial piety, (4) reciprocal obligations, (5) harmony, (6) honesty, and (7) individual performance. Each attribute forms but one element of a whole.
Group Identification. The value system of Tokugawa Japan emphasized "particularism" (Bellah 1957).
In Japan it is the particular group or collective of which one is a member which counts, whether it be family, village, fief ihan), or Japan as a whole. Bellah argues that commitment to these groups tends to take precedence over "universalistic" commitments, such as commitments to truth or justice, Nakane (1970) makes a similar point in her classic study of modern-day Japanese society. Nakane notes that in Japan the group with which an individual is associated is of primary importance, and the attribute of an individual is of secondary importance, Nakane goes on to argue that the primacy of the group to which an individual belongs often evolves into a deeply emotional attachment in which the identification with the group becomes all-important in one's life. Moreover, strong identification with a group is argued to create pressures for mutual self-help and collective action. If the worth of an individual is closely linked to the achievements of a group, as Nakane maintains is the case in Japan, this creates a strong incentive for individual members of the group to work together for mutual gain.
For an explanation of why the group should be so important in Japan one needs to consider agrarian village life in Tokugawa Japan (Aoki 1988 , Smith 1959 . With over 80 percent of the population living in rural areas, economic development during this period depended primarily on increases in the scale and productivity of rice production. To make the land suitable for rice paddy cultivation, irrigation systems had to be developed. This required collective work on the part of individuals and collective control over the water supply system. Moreover, rice production requires that seedlings raised in nursery beds are transplanted to rice paddies at the right moment. This necessitated significant cooperation between individuals to ensure a sufficient supply of both labor and water.
The family was the primary group and economic unit in rural Japan. While the family might consist of several generations it was usually not very large since "collaterals" were excluded. Since the family was too small to carry out much of the cooperative work involved in rice production, larger groups were needed. In Tokugawa Japan this was facilitated by organizing families into companies of five families each {gonin-gumi). The gonin-gumi were formed from contiguous families regardless of class differences or kinship relations. As and when the need arose, they functioned as self-help and cooperative work units. Above the gonin-gumi was the village, which was the basic territorial unit in Tokugawa Japan, For cooperative tasks that exceeded the capacity of the gonin-gumi the village became the basic work group.
The hypothesis inherent in this description is that the need for cooperative work both within and among families, as dictated by the technology of rice growing, resulted in the formation of a group structure and the development of a value system that encouraged individuals to identify their achievements with those of the group, whether that was the family, the gonin-gumi, or the village. This value system stressed the virtue of collective action within the framework of a group. By focusing on the need for individuals to work together for the good of the group, this value system attenuated one of the problems inherent in group (team) based production: how to limit free riding by individual members (Alchain and Demsetz 1972) , Thus, the value system reduced the transaction costs required to achieve cooperation.
Collective Responsibility. In Tokugawa Japan the social sanction that reenforced group identification and produced strong pressures for cooperation and group conformity was the principle of collective responsibility. Failure to conform to social norms and values was considered not merely to be a matter of individual responsibility. Rather, the family, gonin-gumi, and even village might be taken into account by superordinates for the actions of a single individual (Bellah 1957 , Smith 1983 , To quote Bellah: every person in his social actions was in a representative role with regard to his primary collective, A wrong step would jeopardize not only himself but could bring disaster upon his group or at best leave it open for contempt and ridicule (1957, p, 31), Bellah also notes that the group itself would tend to view conformity with social norms as more important than group membership. Thus, in addition to external social sanctions, a transgressor was more apt to receive rejection rather than support from his primary group in the case of any serious misdeed on his part. This was true even of the family group where, according to Bellah:
The basic psychological pressure was the threat of rejection symbolized most pointedly, perhaps, by disinheritance. To be cast adrift without the support of relatives in a society such as Japan was indeed the worst of all possibilities (1957, p, 35) , Thus peer group pressure, backed up with the ultimate sanction of rejection from the group, was used as a mechanism by groups to control their own members and foster conformity, thereby reducing the transaction costs required to constrain shirking.
Loyalty and Filial Piety. Pressures towards group identification and group conformity were further reenforced by the wide acceptance of the ethic of loyalty to superordinates. In neo-Confucian ideology loyalty to one's superiors was regarded as a sacred duty; an absolute obligation that was necessary for religious salvation. Of course, it was in the best interest of the Tokugawa shogunate to propagate such a belief. By most accounts, the shogunate was successful in doing so, since the virtue of loyalty permeated all layers of society (Bellah 1957 , Maruyama 1974 , Ooms 1985 , It found expression in loyalty to the head of the collective, whether that be a family head, the head of the gonin-gumi, the village head, the feudal lord, the shogunate, or the emperor.
At the level of the family, the concept of loyalty was paralleled by the Confucian concept of filial piety (devotion and obligation to one's parents). Fused with the Shinto practice of ancestor worship, filial piety took on a strong religious dimension in Japan. Since Shinto theology stresses the common ancestry of all Japanese, with the Imperial family being the main house of which all Japanese families are branches, the concept of filial piety could easily be extended to embrace devotion and obligation to the emperor (on whose behalf the shogunate ruled).
While the values of loyalty and filial piety obviously complement each other, Bellah (1957) stresses that filial piety is ultimately subordinate to loyalty in Japan. Polity overrides loyalty, and in the case of conflict of loyalty, the first duty is to one's lord rather than one's family (in contrast to China, where the opposite is the case). From an economic perspective the strong bonds of loyalty that bind the Japanese to the heads of their collectives can be viewed as making it less costly for the heads to coordinate and control their subordinates (transaction costs are reduced). More generally, the values of loyalty, group identification, and collective responsibility, by reducing the free riding/Shirking problem, can all be seen as reducing the transaction costs of coordination and control.
Reciprocal Obligations. The concepts of loyalty and filial piety focus on the obligation of subordinates to superordinates. However, the neo-Confucian ethic not only stresses that one owes obligations to superiors, it also stresses that superiors owe obligations to inferiors for benefits derived from them (Bellah 1957 , Dore 1987 , Nakan 1970 , Smith 1983 , The political authority has the obligation to bestow blessings {on) on the people subject to it. Although the scale of obligation varies greatly depending on the relative hierarchical position of the two parties, there is no doubt that a failure to repay obligations can undermine the position of the transgressor. The eventual fall of the Tokugawa shogunate, for example, has been attributed to a failure to bestow sufficient blessings on the samurai class (Bellah 1957) , Smith (1983) indicates that an individual's reputation is tied up with his diligence in performing obligations. The person who violates the reciprocal relationship will be branded as one without integrity or honor and subject to substantial informal sanctions. This may include rejection by his peers from whatever group he belongs to. Alternatively, the person who pursues the code with diligence is universally admired. Smith also notes that the relationships established through the performance of reciprocal obligations tend to be seen as perpetual, with one repayment calling forth yet another expression of favor or consideration.
In modern day Japan hierarchical relationships based around reciprocal obligations are still evident. Nakane (1970) argues that the life time employment system is based upon this concept. She sees the loyalty and service given by employees to the company as being balanced by the obligation of the company towards its employees. This reciprocal obligation finds expression in the "blessings" of lifetime employment, senioritybased pay systems, and attractive retirement benefits. Similarly, Dore (1987) argues that the relationship between a prime manufacturer and its subcontractors is one involving reciprocal obligations. According to Dore, the obligation of the subcontractor to diligently serve the prime manufacturer's needs is repaid by the obligation of the prime manufacturer to conimit to a longterm relationship with the subcontractor.
Later in this paper it is argued that the long-term nature of relationships based on the concept of reciprocal obligations, and the importance of reputation effects in policing such implicit contracts, lowers transaction costs and facilitates specific asset investments. Thus, employees are persuaded to make investments in specialized skills that have a low market value outside their company, while subcontractors are persuaded to make similar specific asset investments.
Harmony. Both Confucian and Buddhist traditions stress the virtue of harmony (wa), by which they mean the avoidance of wanton opposition and the importance of building cooperative, benevolent, and trusting relationships (Smith 1983) , In this sense, the virtue of harmony is complementary to the concept of reciprocal obligations. Reciprocal obligations are far easier to maintain and fulfill if both parties are committed towards building harmonious relationships with each other. Insofar as the virtue of harmony is successful in achieving this, the transaction costs of achieving cooperation will be lowered, Bellah (1957) adds to this, noting that harmony must be maintained within groups because conflict between the members would not only be disloyal to the head, but would also disrupt the smooth attainment of collective goals. Thus willingness to compromise, forbearance, and the like, are highly valued, whereas disputatiousness, contentiousness, overweening ambition or other disruptive behavior is disapproved. This does not mean that groups in Japan are dominated by a lack of debate. On the contrary, the neo-Confucian ideology encourages subordinates to express their opinions, even if they do differ with those of the leader, and emphasizes that the wise leader listens to his subordinates. However, once a decision is made, the concepts of harmony and collective responsibility stress the need to close ranks behind the leader (Dore 1987) , Honesty. Another central value of neo-Confucian ideology concerns the need for honesty and morality in dealings with others. While the need to maintain high moral standards in dealings with others is presented as a religious imperative, the economic consequences were not lost on neo-Confucian thinkers. One of the leading neo-Confucian thinkers of the early Tokugawa period, Yamaga Soko (1622-1685), makes the following observation about the need for honest dealing between farmers, artisans, and tradesmen:
If, however, each is bent on promoting his own interests, in utter disregard of the interests of others-the farmer trying to live an easy life without putting sufficient energy into his agricultural work, the artisan contriving to realize big profits by supplying goods of poor quality, and the tradesman devoted to profiteering by dishonest means-there will be no end to the unscrupulous practices and disputes that will arise and moral principles will be completely lost (Bellah 1957, pp, 113-114), There also seems to have been a recognition on the part of several thinkers during the Tokugawa period of the relationship between honest dealing, reputation effects, and economic performance (Bellah 1957 , Honjo 1940 . The basic message being that in the long run, honesty and cooperation are always the best policy, the effect of dishonest behavior being a negative reputation and subsequent damage to business.
The idea that honesty is the best policy finds modern day echoes in the game theory literature on the iterative prisoner's dilemma of an unknown length, Axelrod (1984), Kreps (1990) and Hill (1990) , among others, have come to the conclusion that it pays individual actors to pursue a tit-for-tat strategy that gives primacy to cooperation (honesty), but which retaliates in kind when others act opportunistically (dishonestly). Underlying this analysis is an appreciation of the importance of reputation effects. The gains from trade are maximized when actors that have reputations for honest dealing interact with each other. The gains from trade are dissipated whenever one df the actors has a reputation for dishonest dealing and the other is obliged to adopt costly safeguards. The transaction cost implications of this are fairly obvious. In a society where honesty is highly valued, economic actors can trust each other to a much greater degree than in a society where honesty is not valued. Consequently, the transaction costs required to realize gains from trade are reduced.
Of course, recognition of the importance of honesty and morality is hardly confined to neo-Confucian ideology. It is a central component of most religious traditions, including Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Moreover, as argued by Weber (1958) , in Calvinistic theology the need for morality and honesty in economic dealings is stressed. Thus, one might argue that there is nothing unique about neo-Confucian injunctions against earning an "unjust profit," While this is true, the point is that when the stress on honesty is joined together with the other informal constraints already discussed, the overall effect may be qualitatively different from that found in the West, Individual Performance. So far the discussion has emphasized the primacy of the group in traditional Japanese society. It would be wrong to conclude from this that individual performance is therefore less valued than in the West, Individual performance is highly valued in Japanese society and is a major source of advancement. However, unlike the West where an individual's achievements are often assessed in relative isolation, in Japan individual performance in service of the group is the goal that is really valued. This goal encourages group members to simultaneously cooperate and compete with each other. Indeed, there is a sense in which they are competing on the basis of their ability to cooperate, Bellah (1957) has described how this system functioned in the merchant houses of the Tokugawa period. The merchant houses had a highly structured ranking hierarchy with at least five main ranks from apprentice to general manager {shihainin), who was second only to the master. Promotion within the ranking hierarchy of the merchant houses was based initially on seniority, but the higher one got, the more merit took precedence over seniority. Merit was evaluated in terms of performance in pursuit of collective goals. Moreover, Bellah notes that:
The collective goal was the highest aim and if the shihainin was more active in performance with respect to that goal he could, for practical purposes, supersede the master, the holder of legitimate status, in the decision making process. The shihainin might ultimately marry a daughter of the house and be set up as a head of an official branch of the family, (1957, p, 50) , Aoki (1988) has documented how a similar system persists in the modern Japanese firm. Individual compensation within a given rank in the modem Japanese firm is based on both seniority and merit. While basic individual pay is frequently tied to seniority, this is typically supplemented by merit pay. Merit is assessed by supervisors (group leaders) over a wide range of characteristics that emphasize individual performance in pursuit of group goals.
Like everything else reviewed here, this simultaneous emphasis on cooperation and competition has transaction cost implications. The high value placed upon individual performance in pursuit of collective goals is another factor reducing the transaction costs of achieving cooperation, while limiting free riding and opportunism.
Transaction Costs in Japan
The proposition that the informal institutional constraints described here cast a long shadow over modern day Japan has been confirmed by the modern anthropological work on Japan (Abbeglen 1958; Nakane 1970; Smith 1983 Smith , 1992 . Given this, below we consider how these institutions facilitate cooperation and specialization within modern Japanese firms.
Cooperation
One can argue that due to the informal constraints of Japanese society, the transaction costs required to achieve a given level of cooperation will be lower than within comparable Western organizations. Hence, their production costs will also be lower. The reason being that the informal constraints of Japanese society contain a series of group oriented mechanisms that limit shirking and facilitate cooperation. In contrast, the individualism that Hofstede (1983) has documented in Western societies is less conductive to the collective ideal.
The Japanese value system facilitates cooperation by encouraging self-control and peer group control. In addition, the value system encourages individuals to cooperate with each other in the attainment of group goals. All of this reduces the need for hierarchical mechanisms to coordinate, monitor and evaluate performance within an organization, and for formal incentive systems to align the interests of employer and employee.
Self control occurs when individuals control their own behavior. Self control is encouraged by the strong identification of individuals with their group. Within the firm, the status of employees is linked to the ranking of their immediate work group (or subunit) by others in the organization. In society at large, the status of employees is linked to the ranking of their firm (Nakane 1970), Since an employee's status is tied both to the status of his immediate work group, and to the status of the firm as a whole, he has a nonmonetary incentive to work hard. The tradition of loyalty to a leader reenforees this identification with the organization. In passing, it should be noted that loyalty to a leader is really loyalty to a leadership position, and not to the individual who fills it (Bellah 1957) . This implies that loyalty to the organization is the paramount value. As such, this reenforees the concept of group identification.
Peer group control occurs when individual group members monitor and control each other's behavior. Peer group control is also facilitated by the phenomenon of group identification. When status is tied up with the performance of the group, there is a strong incentive to control not only one's own behavior, but also to monitor the behavior of others in the group to ensure that they don't shirk. This incentive is strengthened by the concept of collective responsibility. When all suffer for the transgressions of one, individuals have an obvious incentive to monitor each other's behavior and to criticize shirkers. As in the case of the traditional family or five family group, psychological pressure backed up by the threat of rejection may be used by peers to limit shirking.
Cooperative behavior within an employee's immediate work group, and between work groups within the larger organization, is also encouraged by the phenomenon of group identification. Since cooperation enhances performance and, therefore, the ranking of the group and the status of those who belong to it, an incentive for cooperation is created. In addition, the value placed on individual performance in pursuit of group goals further strengthens the incentive for cooperation, while the stress placed on harmony facilitates cooperation both with a work group and between work groups within the larger organization.
This discussion suggests the self-control, peer group control and cooperative behavior that fiows out of the strong group identification within Japanese society should have two observable consequences for Japanese firms when compared to firms based in societies where collectivism is less important. First, Japanese firms should be able to function with more decentralized management systems since the need for hierarchical coordination and control mechanisms is reduced, and second, they should be able to achieve cooperation more easily since the transaction costs of doing so are lower.
There is evidence to support both of these propositions. Lincoln et al, (1986) compared Japanese and American firms and found that Japanese firms were significantly more decentralized than comparable American enterprises. Consistent with this, the use of self-managing work teams, which requires substantial decentralization, is reportedly widespread among Japanese manufacturing organizations (Aoki 1988 , Womack et al. 1990 ). In contrast, while many American organizations are now trying to imitate Japanese practice and adopt self-managing teams, a recent study suggests that many are having difficulty doing so (Wheelwright and Clark 1992) . This is what one might expect given the individualism in America and the corresponding lack of cultural predisposition towards collectivism. This is not to imply that self-managing teams can't be adopted in America-they can-but it won't be as easy given the lack of cultural bedrock.
As for cooperation, one of the main conclusions of the recent study of American competitiveness by the MIT Commission on Competitiveness, which compared 200 Japanese, U.S., and European firms, was that Japanese firms were much better at facilitating cooperation than their Western competitors (Dertouzos et al, 1989) . Indeed, the Commission argued that relative to their Japanese competitors, many American firms were characterized by a "failure of cooperation," Specialization Investments in specialization are valued because they increase productivity. They are difficult to achieve, however, because of the fear of hold-up. Hence, transaction costs must be borne to facilitate investments in specialization. If one compares Japan to the West, one can argue that many of the informal constraints of Japanese society reduce {but do not eliminate) the risk of hold-up. As a consequence, the transaction costs required to persuade an actor to make a specialized investment may be lower in Japan. Here we discuss this phenomenon in detail with reference to two examples; subcontracting in the automobile industry and the lifetime employment system. Subcontracting in the Automobile Industry. In the U.S. automobile industry the relatively expensive solution of vertical integration has been necessary to persuade component part suppliers to make specific asset investments (Klein et al, 1978, Monteverde and Teece 1982) . The solution is expensive because of the bureaucratic diseconomies of hierarchy. In contrast, in Japan the less expensive solution of credible commitments has been used with success to persuade component parts suppliers to make specific asset investments. The Japanese auto makers have committed themselves to enter into long-term relationships with their major suppliers. They have made this commitment credible by providing their major suppliers with capital in the form of minority shareholdings, and by providing managerial and technical assistance. This solution is less expensive than hierarchy because it achieves the same economic benefits as vertical integration (investments in specialization) without the same bureaucratic diseconomies. Moreover, it achieves the same close relationship between supplier and buyer that vertical integration achieves, without ultimately dispensing with market discipline. Suppliers know that the relationship will only be maintained so long as they perform adequately with regard to cost, quality, and delivery goals. However, they also know that so long as they meet these goals, the auto manufacturer will adhere to its longterm commitment.
As a consequence, in the mid 1980s, major Japanese companies such as Toyota and Nissan manufactured less than 30% of their component parts in-house, compared to 70% at General Motors and 50% at Ford (Aoki 1988 , Womack et al. 1990 ). Since the Japanese companies have generally had to bear less transaction costs to achieve the same reduction in resource costs, their overall production costs have been significantly lower (Cusumano 1982 , Womack et al, 1990 .
The real issue here is why were the Japanese companies able to achieve the same end (investments in specialization) for a lower transaction cost? Why have credible commitments worked in Japan, while vertical integration has been necessary in the U.S.? A plausible answer is that the stress placed in the Japanese value system on the fulfillment of reciprocal obligations, when backed up by notions of honesty and harmony, work to increase trust and lower the potential for opportunism between the parties to an exchange. Thus, the transaction costs required to achieve investments in specialization were lowered. To appreciate this we must look more closely at the Japanese subcontracting system. The description below follows that of Aoki (1988), Cusumano (1982) , Shimokawa (1985) , and Womack et al, (1990) .
In Japan the auto manufacturers have organized their suppliers into hierarchical associations consisting of first-tier and second-tier suppliers. The first-tier suppliers are the major suppliers. They are responsible for major subassemblies, components, or material inputs. The first-tier suppliers subcontract out to the second-tier suppliers, who in turn may subcontract some work out to other (tertiary) suppliers. Toyota and Nissan have both taken minority shareholdings in many of their first-tier suppliers, of which Toyota has around 220 and Nissan has 160. The relationships between the auto companies and their first-tier suppliers are stable and long-term (Toyota and Nissan have used many of the same first-tier suppliers for 30 years).
The first-tier suppliers typically make substantial specific asset investments, in terms of physical assets, skills, and location, in order to serve the needs of an auto company. They will site their factories next door to major auto assembly plants so as to facilitate the workings of the kanban system of just-in-time inventory. And they will dedicate significant amounts of personal time, equipment and research money towards designing, testing and producing subcomponents for exclusive use by the primary assembly company with which they are associated. In return, the auto companies commit themselves to purchase a substantial proportion of a first-tier supplier's output. The minority shareholding taken by the auto company in its first-tier suppliers can be seen as adding credibility to this commitment. In addition, the auto company will often provide managerial and technical expertise to its firsttier suppliers. Moreover, the auto companies have also been known to support individual first-tier suppliers through financially difficult years.
Thus, we see in the relationship between an auto company and its first-tier suppliers the working out of reciprocal obligations that are so central to the Japanese value system. The supplier makes specialized investments in order to better serve the needs of the auto company, and the auto company reciprocates by supporting the supplier in a variety of ways. One should be under no allusion, however, about the hierarchical nature of this relationship. This is not a deal among equals; the auto company is clearly the superordinate and the suppliers are subordinates. Nevertheless, the auto company recognizes that in order to maintain the cooperation of its subordinates it is obhged to commit itself to its suppliers. In turn, the suppliers trust that the auto company will live up to its commitment. The suppliers' trust is not groundless; there is after all the commitment of capital on the part of the auto company. Moreover, recall that implicit in neo-Confucian ethical thought is a recognition of the importance of reputation effects. Thus, as Aoki has put it, the auto manufacturer: must maintain its reputation of commitment to the subcontractor in order to elicit the subcontractor's commitment regarding relation specific investments in expertise, equipment, and research and development (1988, p, 216), The suppliers know this and thus can have reasonable confidence that the auto company will not renege on agreements.
In sum, the cultural predisposition of the Japanese to recognize the importance of fulfilling reciprocal obligations and maintaining a reputation for honest dealing all contributed to building an atmosphere of trust that laid the foundations upon which the subcontracting system was constructed. The value system of Japanese society made this economically efficient organizational arrangement relatively easy to formulate and implement. In contrast, a general absence of such informal institutional constraints in countries such as the United States meant that the cultural bedrock upon which such transaction cost economizing business relationships could be built were lacking. This made it more difficult for auto companies in the U.S. to formulate and implement such arrangements. Hence, vertical integration was the predominant response to the problem of getting suppliers to make specific asset investments.
The Lifetime Employment System. We have already referred to the use of self-managing teams in Japanese organizations. According to Aoki (1988) , within many Japanese firms self-managing teams take on important management functions, including the responsibility for quality and performance monitoring, and for production scheduling and coordination between adjacent units within the overall work process, Aoki goes on to argue that achieving this level of decentralization requires that lower level employees within self-managing teams develop a much broader range of context-dependent skills than required in the stereotypical American enterprise. They have to be skilled at performing all of the different tasks that fall within the mandate of the team. To achieve this requires a significant amount of on-the-job and off-the-job training. The firm typically finances off-the-job training, while much on-the-job training of employees is undertaken by peers within a new employee's immediate work group. The potential reward to the firm from increasing the skill level of its employees is higher productivity. The potential reward to the employees from making a substantial investment, in acquiring and sharing skills is a share in the quasirents that derive from that specialization.
The hold-up risks here are two-sided. On the one hand, employees in possession of rare and valuable skills have a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis the firm. Other things being equal, this might make the firm hesitant to undertake substantial investments in training, particularly if the workforce is highly unionized, for fear that the employees will then expropriate all of the proceeds. On the other hand, the contextdependent nature of many of these skills means that their value may be reduced in their next best use. This puts the firm in a relatively strong bargaining position vis-a-vis employees. Other things being equal, the inability to exercise the exit option without losing income might make employees hesitant to invest in acquiring and sharing firm-specific skills. Thus, a situation of bilateral dependency is created in which the most likely outcome is underinvestment in the acquisition of firm-specific skills, a scenario in which the gains from specialization are not realized.
The lifetime employment system offers a way out of this dilemma. By guarantying lifetime employment, the firm is making a credible commitment to employees that it won't use the threat of unemployment to expropriate the quasi-rent due to them from their investment in specialization. But why should the firm make this commitment, since it enhances the bargaining power of highly skilled employees? There are two answers to this question.
First, the phenomena of group identification and loyalty serves to bond employees to their enterprise (Nakane 1970), This makes it less likely that employees will opportunistically abuse their bargaining position. This does not mean that employees will forebear from industrial action if the firm fails to live up to its side of the bargain. However, given the cultural context of a value system in which reciprocal obligations loom large, Japanese firms generally recognize that their own best interest is served by fulfilling their obligations to skilled employees. Note, however, that this benevolence does not extend to unskilled employees, who frequently are classified as "temporary" workers and, accordingly, do not receive the protection of the lifetime employment system. Second, as Aoki (1988) has documented, the incentive structure of many Japanese firms reduces the bargaining power of skilled employees. As noted earlier, in most Japanese firms pay is determined by a mix of seniority (length of service) and merit. In addition, employees receive a generous lump sum payment upon retirement. If they voluntarily leave the firm before their retirement date, however, they lose most if not all of this payment. Moreover, when they move to the new firm although they may be paid according to their ability (merit), they lose the length of service component of their pay. Thus, the overall financial loss to an individual from exercising the exit option can be substantial.
In sum, this system encourages both firms and individuals to make the investments in training required to achieve employee skill levels consistent with the selfmanaging team philosophy. Skilled employees are encouraged to make these investments by the guarantee of lifetime employment, and by their own identification with and loyalty to the firm. They are also discouraged from leaving the firm by the substantial exit costs in the form of a loss of seniority and retirement benefits. For their part, employers know that they must fulfill their obligations, rewarding employees for their investments in specialization. If they don't, but instead unilaterally tear up lifetime employment contracts and use their bargaining position to drive down labor costs, the long-term cost to the firm from the negative reputation effect may be serious.
This arrangement is efficient since it allows the gains from specialization to be realized. As in the case of subcontracting, elements of the Japanese value system have made implementation of this rational arrangement easier. In particular, the phenomena of group identification, loyalty, and reciprocal obligations all play a part in lowering resistance to this arrangement. Thus, once perfected in the 1950s, the lifetime employment system and ranking hierarchy diffused rapidly throughout parts of Japanese industry. In contrast, while some Western firms have had a similar lifetime employment system, the innovation is less widespread in the West, It is the thesis of this paper that one reason for the failure of Western firms to adopt this arrangement is that the relatively weak informal constraints limiting opportunism in many Western societies forms a major impediment to their adoption.
Conclusion
There is a debate in the literature on Japan between two schools of thought. One attributes much of Japan's economic success to a unique culture (Abegglen 1958 , Dore 1987 , Nakane 1970 , Smith 1992 . Another school maintains that Japan's economic success is due to the fact that, in the face of economic adversity, the Japanese adopted organizational forms that are the natural outcome of economically rational behavior in advance of the West (e,g,, Dore 1973 , Koike 1984 . The argument contained in this paper suggests that this debate is misplaced. Many Japanese firms have adopted economically efficient organizational forms in advance of the West (see Aoki 1988 Aoki , 1990 Cusumano 1982; Dertouzos et al. 1989; Schonberger 1982; Womack et al. 1990) , At the same time, these efficient organizational forms, which emerged first in Japan, have diffused more rapidly and completely in that country, and in general still work better in Japanese enterprises, in part because the culture of that country made identification and implementation of the efficient Solution much easier. The informal constraints of Japanese society have lowered the transaction costs of adopting economically efficient organizational arrangements.
Having said this, a number of caveats are also in order. First, the argument offered here may only provide a partial explanation for the economic success of Japanese firms. Among other things, many believe that Japan's industrial policy, as orchestrated by MITI, also played a role (Borrus et al, 1986; Yamamura 1982 Yamamura , 1986 , The argument contained in this paper neither supports nor rules out this possibility, although as pointed out earlier, MITI worked through Japan's informal rather than formal constraints to achieve its objectives.
Second, it is not being argued here that opportunism is negligible in Japan, There is opportunism in Japan-as the 1992 stockmarket scandal demonstrates. All that is being proposed is that the informal constraints of Japanese society do a relatively better job of holding opportunism in check than those of many Western societies. Nor is it being argued that the organizational arrangements mentioned abovegreater decentralization, self-managing teams, longterm contracting and lifetime employment-are characteristic of all Japanese firms. Far from it, for in many cases the benefits of adopting such organizational arrangements outweigh the costs. However, in those industries where the problem of cooperation is acute and the benefits of investments in specialization are great-such as automobile manufacture and consumer electronics-these arrangements are widespread in Japan, Moreover, in such industries these organizational arrangements are more widespread than in Western societies (Aoki 1990 , Dertouzos et al. 1989 , Nor is it being suggested in this paper that nonJapanese firms cannot adopt these economically efficient organizational arrangements. The organizational arrangements described herein can be found in some Western firms as well (see Ouchi and Johnson 1978 , Ouchi and Jeager 1978 , Ouchi 1980 , Hill 1990 . Moreover, many Western firms are now trying to imitate "Japanese" management practices. Despite reports of implementation difficulties, many will ultimately be successful. All that has been argued in this paper is that the informal constraints of Japan have made both identification and implementation of the rational solution easier (less costly). The Japanese got there first, and relatively more Japanese firms have adopted these organizational arrangements, because the informal constraints of Japanese society provided the cultural bedrock upon which they could be built.
